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In addition to these arguments, a few courts have held that
relevation of defendant's insurance at discovery violates his fifth
amendment constitutional rights. 4 The argument is that insurance
is an asset of defendant and that if discovery is allowed, there is no
rational basis to deny discovery as to all of defendant's assets before
liability is established. 35 Thus, Hillman v. Penny,36 a Tennessee
federal case, expressed the fear that a groundless claim might become the vehicle for making full inquiry into all the confidential
affairs of any defendant involved in an automobile accident.3 7
The arguments for relevancy of insurance as illustrated by Welty
thus seem to be answered both by the purpose of discovery, i.e., to
get to the merits, and the limitations on discovery, i.e., to matters of
evidence or matters that may lead to evidence. Nevertheless, the
courts are almost evenly divided on this question. As a number of
courts seem to disregard the purpose and language of Rule 26(b),
an amendment or a definitive decision by the United States Supreme
Court would seem desirable in order to have uniformity throughout
the federal system. When the North Carolina General Assembly
considers Rule 26(b), it specifically should either include or exclude
liability insurance from discovery.
EUGENE W.

PURDOM

Civil Rights Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-Private
Club Exemption
In United States v. Northwest La. Restaurant Club1 a threejudge federal court held that the acts and practices of the members
of defendant club constituted an unlawful deprivation of rights
secured to Negro citizens for the free and equal use and enjoyment
of public accommodations guaranteed by Title II of the Civil Rights
" Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283, 287 (E.D. Ill.
1958). For a thorough

discussion of the constitutional problem see Note, 34 NoTRE DAME LAW.
78 (1958).
" See, Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Gallimore
v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp.
612 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Contra, Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12
F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), which holds that a liability policy is not an
asset but purchase protection for both compensatory and punitive damages.
29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
"lId.at 161.

'256 F. Supp. 151 (1966).
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Act of 1964.2 In an attempt to avail themselves of the exemption of
"a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public," '3 the members, some one hundred restaurants, had formed a
non-profit corporation named the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club. An action, seeking a permanent injunction against
further discrimination, was brought by the Attorney General of the
United States under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5.4 The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law.5
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first federal government
effort at prohibition of discrimination as to race since the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.' The earlier act had been declared unconstitutional in The Civil Rights Cases because it attempted to base on
the fourteenth amendment its power to restrict discrimination by
individuals. The new act has survived the test of constitutionality.
Its provision for relief against state actions is supported by the long
line of cases holding that Congress possesses such power under
section five of the fourteenth amendment. 9 Its source of authority
2 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1964).
*78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964).
*78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) (1964) provides that
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that
any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this
subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is
intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the
Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district
court ....

78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(b) (1964) requires the Attorney General
to certify that he feels that the case is of general public importance.
'256 F. Supp. at 151.
'18 Stat. 335 (1875).
109 U.S. 3 (1883). The public accommodations section of the act of
1875 was applicable to individual offenders and was not dependent upon
state action, which led to its destruction. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83

U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873), had held that the purpose of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment was to protect individuals from dis-

crimination by state, not individual, action. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a

strong dissent in The Civil Rights Cases.
878 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)

(1964)

provides that each of the

named establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation if it is "supported by state action."
'E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The scope of the
authority within the prohibition of discrimination supported by state action
is wide. Peripheral types of state activity have been brought within the
sphere of state action. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (enforcement by state court of a covenant banning sale of real property to Negroes
is state action); see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715 (1961) (lessee of state-owned property is bound by the fourteenth
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for the provision against discrimination by individuals is the commerce clause of the constitution."0 Two cases" have supported its
constitutionality on this theory.
The private establishment exemption provides that "the provisions of . . . [the act] shall not apply to a private club or other

establishment not in fact open to the public .. ."" The act does
not articulate the reason for this exemption, but most certainly it
must rest upon traditional notions of the rights of association and
privacy. 18 Predictably, restaurants and other establishments, whose
prior activities would constitute illegal discrimination under the new
law, seized upon the exemption and attempted to create "private"
clubs in order to avoid the necessity of compliance. 4 According
amendment in the conduct of a restaurant on that property) ; see Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (city's control and maintenance of park
devised to city for use of white people only subjects it to restraints of fourteenth amendment); see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (arrest
of Negroes by police after false reports that such Negroes had committed
criminal acts would be sufficient state action.)
"0U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1964)
provides that each of the named establishments which serves the public is
a place of public accommodation if its operations "affect commerce."
For arguments that this is an unconstitutional broadening of the commerce powers see Rice, Federal Public-Accomnodations Law: A Dissent,
17 MERCER L. REv. 338 (1966); Note, 16 S.C.L. REv. 646 (1964).
"Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(inn, seventy-five per cent of whose customers traveled in interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant, "Ollie's
Barbeque," purchased forty-six per cent of its meat from local supplier
who had procured it from outside the state).
1278 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964). The section concludes with
the statement that the club's facilities may not be restricted if they are available to patrons of "places of public accommodation" as defined in earlier
subsections.
" In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1957), the Court stated,
"This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." And in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), "The first amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.... [W]e have protected
forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members."
" The Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1964, p. 1, col. 4:
Many Dixie businessmen, particularly in the big cities, are complying
with the bill. But some are concerned about competition from the
growing number of other establishments shifting to private operation
in a last ditch effort to preserve racial barriers. Besides restaurant
owners, others who have gone 'private' include proprietors of amusement parks, bowling alleys and at least one major hotel.
The Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1964, § A, p. 6, col. 4, related that the new
Civil Rights Act brought a "sudden spate" of private clubs. Both of these
newspaper articles refer to events within Mississippi.
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to the court's decision, this is what was attempted by the members
of the Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club.
The test provided by the language of the statute for determination of the status of the alleged club is simply that it is "not in fact
open to the public." 15 No detailed or sophisticated standards appear
with which to attack the problem of just what is "in fact" open to
the public3 8 Because of the short time since passage of the act and

the resulting small amount of litigation under it, there has not yet
been a great amount of judicial formulation of the tests that are to
be applied.
Thus, as an aid in determination of the aspects to which
the federal courts are likely to turn in forthcoming litigation,
examination may be made of the following: the legislative history
of the exemption, state court decisions rendered under state public
accommodation laws, and the factors deemed significant in the principal case.
The legislative history of the private club exemption is limited
almost entirely to the Senate discussion surrounding an amendment
to the language in the proposed House of Representatives bill. The
House version read, "bona fide private club."'17 The amendment
changed this language to the way it now appears, viz. "not in fact
open to the public."'" The debate made it clear that this change was
made so as to more accurately reflect the intent of Congress that the
motivation for the establishment of the club is not to be the test;
rather, the question is to be one of fact alone.Y Thus it seems clear
1578 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 2000a(e) (1964).
"6 The Act lists in § 2000a(b) establishments which are "places of public
accommodation." But as Professor Van Alstyne, writing on the Ohio law,
points out, "[I]t is impossible to determine the scope of the private club
exemption by listing types of facilities, for the legitimate exclusiveness of
such clubs is more a function of their internal order than of the activity
which they sponsor." Van Alstyne, Civil Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for Ohio, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 688 (1961).
H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(c) (1963).
H7
=R78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 2000a(e) (1964).
'o Senator Long, speaking for the amendment:
Its purpose is to make clear that the test of whether a private club...

is exempt from Title II relates to whether it is, in fact, a private club,
or whether it is, in fact, an establishment not open to the public. It
does not relate to whatever purpose or animus the organizers may
have had in mind when they originally brought the organization or
establishment into existence.
110 CONG. RFc. 13697 (1964).

502

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.45

that according to the manifested intent of the legislators, a club
could be formed primarily so as to exclude Negroes; yet if it is in
fact private, it would not be covered by the act. Regardless of how
one may or may not feel about this as a worthwhile attribute for
an association, such would appear to be in keeping with the courtprotected notions of privacy and right of association.2"
Many states have passed their own public accommodations
laws.2 ' However, it has been the feeling of many that these laws
have proven to be generally ineffective.2 2 This ineffectiveness, plus
the absence of such laws in some states, led to the belief that federal
legislation was needed. Despite this ineffectiveness, state decisions
rendered under these laws are valuable. They provide various factors
that appear to have been significant in determining whether a particular establishment should be exempted as private:
(1) Procedure for obtaining membership. If the evidence is
that white persons are admitted as members with very little formality, e.g., by simply paying a small fee and "signing up," while
Negroes have to present applications (which are seldom if ever approved), doubt is cast upon the contention that the club is in fact
private.23 Lack of genuine qualifications for membership, so that
in practical effect, the only requisite is being white, together with
24
little limitation as to number, has been deemed significant.
(2) Use of the club by persons other than members. If on occasion persons (white) are admitted without any semblance of becom.0 See note 13 supra.
21
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia are apparently the only states that do not have any type of
public accommodations law. For a list of the statutes, see Comment, Public
Accommodations Laws and the Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915 n.9 (1966).
" For the most part, this ineffectiveness rests upon two circumstances:
strict construction and non-use of the state laws. See Comment, 19 U.
MIAM I L. REv. 456, 465 (1965). See also District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953), where the Supreme Court had to decide
whether or not the statute had been repealed by non-use. (Held that it had
not been.)
For a general discussion of state public accommodation laws and the
litigation surrounding their constitutionality see Caldwell, State Public Accommodation Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforcement Programs, 40
WAsir. L. REv. 841 (1965).
2" See Lackey v. Sacoolas, 411 Pa. 235, 191 A.2d 395 (1963).
",See Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d
432 (Sup. Ct. 1955), mwdified, 1 App. Div. 2d 943, 950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
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ing members, it would appear unlikely that the club is private. Of
course, a genuine club permits its members to allow guests to use
the facilities. But the "guest list" will hardly be permitted to become
so great that the club is, in effect, open to the public.
(3) Control arrangement; the existence or non-existence of a
profit motive; characterof the relationshipamong the members. One
writer26 suggests the following types of questions: Are any of the
policy decisions made by the members, or do they merely agree to
decisions made by an independent manager, owner, or nucleus of
members ?27 Is the club a nonprofit organization, perhaps collecting
dues, or is it in practical essence a commercial enterprise, with
profits going to the manager or owner personally? Do short-term
membership cards functionally resemble tickets?28 Is the principal
sustaining element in the club the members' interest in and association with one another, or does the club exist primarily because of
the common interest in the activity of its sponsors ?29 To what extent are those who use the facilities actually acquainted with one
another?
In most of these state cases several of the above factors are discussed. One factor may seem to predominate, but the decisions are
usually based upon a combination of two or more. Seldom is a broad
or general rule stated. In at least one of the cited cases the reason
for formation of the club was examined." ° However, if legislative
intent is to be given weight, motivation should be of no significance
31
under the federal law.
2 See Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio Ct.
App."6 Van
1950).Alstyne,
Civil Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for
Ohio, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 683, 689 (1961). The questions are posed in a discussion of the then new Ohio public accommodations law.
"'See Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1950).
" See Evans v. Ross, 55 NJ. Super. 266, 150 A.2d 512, 4 RAcE REL. L.
REP. 355 (Camden County Ct. 1959), aff'd, 57 N.J. Super. 223, 154 A.2d
441, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 1012 (Super. Ct. 1959), cert. denied, 31 N.J. 292,
157 A.2d 362, 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 209 (1959).
2 See Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d 432
(Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 943, 950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957);
Norman v. City Island Beach Co., 126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y. Supp. 379
(1926).
o See Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d
432 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 943, 950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
" See note 19 supra.
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Turning to the principal case, examination of the court's findings
of fact reveals a reflection only of express dealing with some of the
factors considered in state cases and apparently no dealing with
legislative intent. Indeed, the court seems to have disregarded the
intent of the legislators that motivation is not to be significant, as
it found that the club "was organized and... exists for the purpose
of avoiding the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. " 32 It
is easily understandable that a court would find it difficult to refrain
from attaching significance to motivation. This is especially true
where such a purpose is expressly manifested, as in this case where
the organizers solicited members by representing that the club would
provide a means for circumventing the act. 3 However, this should
be avoided as a test of the "public" or "private" character of the
club.
Procedure for obtaining membership, an important factor in
the state cases, was evidently significant here. This is reflected in
the court's finding that the members "offered and issued membership cards as a matter of course to any white customer without any
requirements or conditions whatsoever. . . ,,14 A consideration of
the use of the club by persons other than members was made when
the court found that the members "served white customers without
regard to whether they were members of the Northwest Louisiana
Restaurant Club. .

. ."

- The nature of the interests of the members

is not mentioned. However, it was found that prior to formation of
the club,3 6 the restaurants were businesses open to the public and
that "the character of its trade and nature of its solicitation to the
general public [of each member restaurant] had not changed by
reason of its membership in the club."' 37 Implicit in this finding is
the fact that the only interest binding the members was avoidance
of having to serve Negroes. Clearly, this is not the associational
interest in one another that the act would seem to contemplate. Relevant here is the finding that the club conducted no general meetings
"256 F. Supp. at 152.
8'Id. at 153.
"Id. at 153.

"Id. at 153.
'The club was found to have been chartered as a corporation on June

30, 1964, only two days before the effective date of the act. Id. at 152.
8TId. at 153
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after July, 1964.38 Hardly can a club be a private association where
the members do not meet together.
It seems apparent that Northwest La. Restaurant Club is a relatively "easy" case, and that the court had little trouble concluding
that the members were not in such a relation that the private club
exemption should be invoked to protect rights of private association.
Such a protectable association did not exist. Because of the ease in
deciding that this was indeed a "sham organization," 9 the court
here simply was not called upon for extensive articulation of the
precise factors that led to the decision.
However, hard cases will come, and more judicial refinement of
the factors considered will be necessary and welcomed. For example,
what will be the decision in regard to the genuinely private club that
grows larger and larger? Will the greater number of members,
many of whom perhaps do not know one another, render the club
so "open.to the public" that it will cease to be exempted? How
would a court hold on a facility, such as a golf course, which ordinarily constitutes a place of public accommodation, but operates as
a "private" club, with associational interests existing among the
members ?40

ROBERT

L.

THOMPSON

Conflict of Laws-Departure from Lex Loci
In Clark v. Clark1 the New Hampshire court applied its own
law and allowed a guest passenger to sue her host for ordinary
negligence rather than applying the stricter Vermont guest statute.
The parties were both from New Hampshire; the automobile accident occurred in Vermont. The decision was a logical extension of
that court's recent holdings in the area of conflicts law. Earlier in
Thompson v. Thompson2 the court abandoned its adherence to
strict lex loci delicti which requires application of the law of the
place of the wrong, overruled a long line of cases, and applied the
3
Id. at 153.
19 Id. at 153.

," Professor Van Alstyne suggests this problem. Van Alstyne, Civil
Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for Ohio, 22 OHio ST. L.J.
683, 688 (1961).
, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
-N.H.2 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).

